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Abstract—Budget allocation for power system reliability 
improvement is considered among the sophisticated problems 
because of its nonlinear nature. This nonlinearity makes the 
problem intractable for large-scale power systems. This paper 
compares two approaches for budget allocation for power system 
reliability improvement. The first method is the traditional one, 
which suffers from the non-convexity and nonlinearity. In the 
second approach, a linear zero-sum mixed-strategy game is 
proposed where a limited budget is allocated among the network 
elements based on the game variables along with an iterative 
algorithm to find the solution. Both models are applied to the 
modified RTBS system.  The results show that while each strategy 
adopts a different tactic for reliability improvement, both 
strategies improve the system reliability to the same level for a 
given budget.  
Keywords— Power system reliability, game theory, budget 
allocation model, natural hazards. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Electric power network is among the most sophisticated 
systems that have been evolved by engineering design. The 
power system is always encountered the risks, including the 
physical intrusion and the natural disasters [1], treats imposed 
from the nature of the power networks like the dynamic 
instability [2]-[4], oscillation of the grid-connected renewable 
generation resources [5], [6] or other sort of components that are 
always threaten the networks [7]-[11]. Different approaches 
including data security enhancement [12], [13], optimization, 
operational procedure and design of new approaches to mitigate 
and protect counter measures are used to improve the reliability 
and resiliency of the power grids [14]-[22]. Innovative and 
effective protective algorithm and damping controller is 
proposed to mitigate the oscillation of renewable generation 
resources in the vicinity of series compensated lines in [6]. 
While there is a wealth of research dealing with optimization in 
grid operation through the stochastic [14] or deterministic 
approaches [15]-[18], but there is a little attraction to improve 
power system resilience, or the reliability through the 
optimization approaches. Salehi et. al [19] evaluated the 
automated substation reliability with different configuration. 
The power system resilience improvement sought through 
network reconfiguration in [20], which can be considered as a 
cost-effective redeem for bulk power system. This approach can 
be utilized in case of extreme event or crafted attack to facilities 
the power restoration [22] as a cost-effective approach. 
Improving power systems reliability against such risks can 
be achieved through the resource allocation models, which seek 
to maximize statistical-reliability of the system [23]. The 
system’s statistical-reliability is the probability that a source-to-
sink path exists in a system at a particular time instant, given the 
network is only subject to statistical failures [24]. The 
interpretation of this concept in the power systems context is to 
define the probabilities that alternate paths between loads and 
generators are available. To this end, we developed two 
optimization models where network planner can recognize the 
most invulnerable elements and allocate his limited resource in 
the right place to improve network reliability.  
Similar to our work, authors in [25] consider the power 
network as the extensive system consisting of subsystems 
connected in series and parallel. Power system reliability 
improvement sought through forming trees of power flow paths, 
which facilitate improving subsystem’s reliability. An integrated 
optimization and simulation method is proposed in [26] that 
nominates the facilities for the reliability improvement 
considering the limited budget. The elaborate Monte Carlo 
simulation approach along with an instance of the Genetic 
Algorithm makes their model computationally expensive, 
particularly in the case of large-scale power networks.  
 A nonlinear approach to power system reliability indices 
improvement is discussed in [27]. While the nonlinearity is the 
most prominent challenge of their model, ant colony 
optimization method is employed to find solutions. A two-player 
non-cooperative game is proposed by [28], where the router and 
attacker are the players. While the attacker targets the most 
critical link in the network, a router seeks to minimize the system 
cost by changing the operation strategies. Similarly, [29] 
proposed a game-theoretic approach, where the author 
recognizes the essential power network’s facilities, which are 
vulnerable to attack. 
While investment planning against deliberate attack is quite 
essential and attracts a considerable amount of attention among 
researchers [29], there is a dearth of work in investment planning 
against natural hazards in the power network, which happen 
frequently [30]. In this paper, we propose models for improving 
network resiliency to address the natural hazards problems. In 
particular, our paper considers two analytical models: one, a 
traditional improvement model, and two, a game-theoretic 
model. In the first approach, a nonlinear model is proposed to 
allocate the limited budget to the elements to maximize power 
system statistical reliability. While this method can distribute the 
budget efficiently among the components, the nonlinearity 
results in an inefficient (or perhaps intractable) model for the 
large-scale power network. 
The second approach is a linear programming mixed-
strategy zero-sum game, which assigns a portion of the budget 
to the most vulnerable elements with an iterative algorithm. The 
algorithm will continue until the budget is exhausted or system 
reaches the desired reliability level. The modified RTBS test 
system is employed to test the model’s performance, and the 
results illustrate that with the same budget, the two approaches 
improve the network reliability to the same level, albeit with 
different strategies. The rest of this paper organized as follows: 
section II proposes the traditional reliability improvement model 
and explains the model with an illustrative example. Section III 
discusses the game-theoretic model, forming the payoffs matrix, 
the steps of algorithms and presents the case study. Finally, 
Section IV gives the conclusion. 
II. TRADITIONAL RELIABILITY IMPROVEMENT MODEL 
The traditional nonlinear reliability improvement model is 
proposed in this section. Fig. 1 shows the modified RTBS 
system [31], where the reliability of generators and lines 
demonstrated beside each element. This grid can be interpreted 
as the network with multiple origins (O) and multiple 
destinations (D), or Multi OD network in short. In this case, the 
sources are generators G1 and G2, and the destinations are loads 
L1-L4, and power traverses the paths between each OD. 
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Fig. 1. Modified RTBS system 
To calculate the statistical reliability between generators and 
lodes, the possible routes between ODs is first enumerated. 
Since the paths between an OD are in parallel, the OD reliability 
of the system with n paths are calculated with the following 
equation: 
𝑅𝑂−𝐷 = 1 − (1 − 𝑝1)(1 − 𝑝2) … (1 − 𝑝𝑛)   (1) 
where 𝑝𝑛  is the reliability of path 𝑛. For example, the paths between G1 and L4 are: 
P𝑎𝑡ℎ 1 = [1,2,4,3,5,6], 𝑝1 = 𝑟𝑔1𝑟3𝑟2𝑟4𝑟5𝑟7 = 0.461 
P𝑎𝑡ℎ 2 = [1,2,4,5,6], 𝑝2 = 𝑟𝑔1𝑟3𝑟2𝑟6𝑟7 = 0.324 
P𝑎𝑡ℎ 3 = [1,3,4,5,6], 𝑝3 = 𝑟𝑔1𝑟1𝑟4𝑟6𝑟7 = 0.412 
P𝑎𝑡ℎ 4 = [1,3,5,6], 𝑝4 = 𝑟𝑔1𝑟1𝑟5𝑟7 = 0.71 
 Then, according to (1), reliability between generator 1 and 
load 4 is: 
𝑅𝐺1−𝐿4 = 1 − (1 − 𝑟𝑔1𝑟3𝑟2𝑟4𝑟5𝑟7)(1 − 𝑟𝑔1𝑟3𝑟2𝑟6𝑟7) 
                   (1 − 𝑟𝑔1𝑟1𝑟4𝑟6𝑟7)(1 − 𝑟𝑔1𝑟1𝑟5𝑟7) = 0.938 
 As can be seen in the abovementioned simple calculations, 
power can traverse through four different paths from G1 to L4. 
While each track is not highly reliable, the 𝑅𝐺1−𝐿4 is relatively reliable because the paths are in parallel. Based on this concept, 
we propose a resource allocation based Multi OD reliability 
improvement model (2)-(6) where system planner can allocate 
his limited budget to improve power network resiliency against 
natural hazards and hence improve system reliability. 
max 1𝑁𝑜𝑑
∑ ∑𝑅𝑜𝑑
𝑑∈𝐿𝑜∈𝐺
 (2) 
subject to  
𝑟𝑖 = 𝑟𝑖0 + 𝑥𝑖;  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐸 (3) 
∑𝑐𝑖
𝑖∈𝐸
𝑥𝑖 = 𝐵𝑅 (4) 
0 ≤ 𝑟𝑖 ≤ 1;  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐸 (5) 
𝑅𝑜𝑑 = 1 − ∏ (1 − 𝑅𝑜𝑑
𝑝 )
𝑝∈𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑜𝑑
; ∀𝑜 ∈ 𝐺,∀𝑑 ∈ 𝐿  (6) 
In the above equations 𝑁𝑜𝑑 is the number of total ODs (8 in our case study), 𝑅𝑜𝑑 is the statistical-reliability between origin 
𝑜  and destination 𝑑 , 𝑟𝑖  is the components reliability after improvement 𝑥𝑖 added to the initial reliability 𝑟𝑖0, 𝑐𝑖 is the cost of reliability improvement for element 𝑖, which are considered 
as 1 for the lines and 2 for the generators, 𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑜𝑑 is the set of paths between origin 𝑜 and destination 𝑑, 𝑅𝑜𝑑𝑝  is the reliability of path 𝑝  between origin 𝑜  and destination 𝑑 , 𝐸  is the set of 
system’s components, 𝐺 is the set of generators or origins,  𝐿 is 
the set of loads or destinations, and 𝐵 is the total budget for 
reliability improvement.. 
In the traditional model, the nonlinear equation (6) is used to 
calculate reliability between each load-generation (OD), while 
(2) serves as an index to measure the overall reliability of the 
power system. Further, (3) is the reliability improvement 
constraint, and (4) is the budget constraint for the reliability 
improvement. Finally, the reliability of each (OD) is ensured to 
be in 0-1 range by (5).  
 The modified RTBS reliability test system shown in Fig. 1 
is employed in this section to show the model’s performance. 
The first step is to enumerate all the paths between generators 
and loads. Table I shows the paths between generators and loads 
in the RTBS system, which forms the components of sets 
𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑜𝑑 . Table II displays the statistical-reliability between generators and loads in each path shown in Table I, and Table 
III demonstrates the overall reliability of each load and generator 
before improvement, or when 𝐵𝑅 = 0. The objective function 
before improvement is 0.917. This is the normalized summation 
of all ODs reliability, which is an 0-1 ranged index and stands 
for the power system reliability. 
TABLE I.  PATHS BETWEEN GENERATORS AND LOADS  
  Loads (destinations)   L1 L2 L3 L4 
G
en
er
at
or
s G1 
{1,2} 
{1,3,4,2} 
{1,3,5,4,2} 
{1,2,4,3} 
{1,2,4,5,3} 
{1,3} 
{1,2,4} 
{1,3,4} 
{1,3,5,4} 
{1,2,4,3,5,6} 
{1,2,4,5,6} 
{1,3,4,5,6} 
{1,3,5,6} 
G2 {2} 
{2,1,3} 
{2,4,3} 
{2,4,5,3} 
{2,1,3,4} 
{2,1,3,5,4} 
{2,4} 
{2,1,3,4,5,6} 
{2,1,3,5,6} 
{2,4,3,5,6} 
{2,4,5,6} 
TABLE II.  STATISTICAL-RELIABILITY OF OD PATHS - BEFORE 
IMPROVEMENT 
Generator Load 𝒑𝟏 𝒑𝟐 𝒑𝟑 𝒑𝟒 
G1 
L1 0.733 0.591 0.388 
 
L2 0.816 0.531 0.348 
 
L3 0.584 0.742 0.487 
 
L4 0.461 0.324 0.412 0.71 
G2 
L1 0.85 
   
L2 0.614 0.616 0.404 
 
L3 0.677 0.558 0.366 
 
L4 0.31 0.534 0.535 0.376 
TABLE III.  OD RELIABILITY - BEFORE IMPROVEMENT 
 
L1 L2 L3 L4 
G1 0.933 0.944 0.945 0.938 
G2 0.85 0.912 0.91 0.907 
 
To examine the model performance, reliability budget 𝐵𝑅 is 
gradually increased from 0 to 1 with an interval of 0.1. Fig. 2 
depicts the trend of system reliability improvement when the 
budget is increasing. As can be seen, the system reliability 
increased considerably when the budget is ranging from 0 to 0.4. 
Fig. 3 shows sensitivity of each OD pair to the budget increment. 
In this figure, the sharpest reliability increment belongs to the 
𝑅𝐺2−𝐿1where there is only one element on its path. While each path has its own trend, the interesting characteristic of this figure 
is that the reliability of the paths that originate from one 
generator has almost the same trend. 
 
Fig. 2. Sensitivity of system’s reliability to budget increment 
 
Fig. 3. Sensitivity of OD reliabilities to budget increment 
 Fig. 4 shows the reliability improvement for each element in 
a different budget. As can be seen 𝑟1 , 𝑟𝑔1  𝑟𝑔2  and 𝑟3 got the 
reliability improvement in the various amount of budget. One 
can say these components are among the important elements 
within the system. Interestingly, 𝑟6 , which has the lowest reliability in the system did not receive any improvement 
through the proposed model. 
 
Fig. 4. Element’s reliability improvement in different budget 
After this illustrative example, the next section proposes 
a linear game-theoretic model for reliability budget 
allocation model 
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III. . RELIABILITY IMPROVEMENT MODEL: GAME-THEORETIC 
APPROACH 
While the model proposed in Section II allocates the budget 
to the proper component, the nonlinearity of (6) may cause an 
intractable problem for the large-scale power network. In this 
section, a game-theoretic approach is proposed which helps the 
system planner to recognize the most vulnerable elements 
against natural hazards. To this end, a two-player zero-sum 
mixed-strategy game between “Blue” (network planner) and 
“Red” (Mother Nature) is established here, where Blue can 
improve network resiliency with spending budget and players 
can only target one component at a time. 
Suppose that the overall network statistical reliability before 
improvement is 𝑅0 . If Red destroys element, the statistical 
reliability will decrease to 𝑅𝑖′, and the associated damage to the system reliability is (𝑅0 − 𝑅𝑖′). This damage is ranging from 0 to 1 since the 𝑅𝑖′ is less than or equal to 𝑅0. In order to improve system resiliency, we need a function that may evaluate the 
invulnerability of the system. This can be achieved by defining 
damage utility function as 𝑦𝑖 = 1 − (𝑅0 − 𝑅𝑖′), which is a 0-1 ranged function that measures system invulnerability resulting 
from a Blue decision.  
The game payoffs, depicted in Fig. 5, shows the outcome of 
a pure strategy game, i.e., the payoff allowed when Red and Blue 
each pick a specific row and column strategy respectively. Let 
us introduce the game variable 𝜓𝑖  as the percentage of total portion of budget consumed on component 𝑖 in a game. The 
percentage of time Blue should adopt the strategy 𝜓𝑖 to improve reliability of component 𝑖 is attributed to a row of the game 
matrix. In the payoff matrix, each row is the Blue’s strategy, 
while each column indicates Red’s decisions. Blue protects and 
Red tampers the component 𝑖  in the ith row and ith column 
respectively. Accordingly, the diagonal elements are those for 
which Blue has already made hundred percent reliability 
improvement strategies and hence they are totally invulnerable 
to damage, while the off-diagonal elements in column 𝑖 indicate 
the damage utility function when Red tampers component 𝑖. 
 
 𝒓𝟏 𝒓𝟐 𝒓𝟑 𝒓𝟒 𝒓𝟓 𝒓𝟔 𝒓𝟕 𝒓𝒈𝟏 𝒓𝒈𝟐 
𝒓𝟏 1 𝑦2 𝑦3 𝑦4 𝑦5 𝑦6 𝑦7 𝑦𝑔1 𝑦𝑔2 
𝒓𝟐 𝑦1 1 𝑦3 𝑦4 𝑦5 𝑦6 𝑦7 𝑦𝑔1 𝑦𝑔2 
𝒓𝟑 𝑦1 𝑦2 1 𝑦4 𝑦5 𝑦6 𝑦7 𝑦𝑔1 𝑦𝑔2 
𝒓𝟒 𝑦1 𝑦2 𝑦3 1 𝑦5 𝑦6 𝑦7 𝑦𝑔1 𝑦𝑔2 
𝒓𝟓 𝑦1 𝑦2 𝑦3 𝑦4 1 𝑦6 𝑦7 𝑦𝑔1 𝑦𝑔2 
𝒓𝟔 𝑦1 𝑦2 𝑦3 𝑦4 𝑦5 1 𝑦7 𝑦𝑔1 𝑦𝑔2 
𝒓𝟕 𝑦1 𝑦2 𝑦3 𝑦4 𝑦5 𝑦6 1 𝑦𝑔1 𝑦𝑔2 
𝒓𝒈𝟏 𝑦1 𝑦2 𝑦3 𝑦4 𝑦5 𝑦6 𝑦7 1 𝑦𝑔2 
𝒓𝒈𝟐 𝑦1 𝑦2 𝑦3 𝑦4 𝑦5 𝑦6 𝑦7 𝑦𝑔1 1 
Fig. 5. Payoff matrix for game-theoretic model 
From the game matrix, the game value can be obtained by 
calculating the expected value of each Red strategy. For 
example, the expected value for the Red’s tampers on element 
𝑟2 , corresponding to column 2, is 𝑦2(𝜓1 ൅ 𝜓3 + 𝜓4 ൅ 𝜓5 +
𝜓6 ൅ 𝜓7 + 𝜓𝑔1 ൅ 𝜓𝑔2) + 𝜓2. Based on the above explanation, 
(7)-(9) shows the game-theoretic model, where 𝜐 is the value of 
the game, which is equal to statistical-reliability of the system. 
max 𝜐 (7) 
subject to  
𝜐 ≤ 𝑦𝑖 ∑ 𝜓𝑗
𝑖,𝑗∈𝐸
 𝑖≠𝑗
+ 𝜓𝑖;  ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐸 (8) 
∑𝜓𝑖
𝑖∈𝐸
= 1 (9) 
Constraint (8) is the game constraints as explained above and 
(9) enforces the game variables sum to 1, promising a mixed-
strategy defensive game. The proposed game should repeat 
iteratively to allocate the total budget to the elements or in order 
to reach the desired reliability level. To this end, our proposed 
algorithm is described as per the following steps.   
Step 0: set the iteration counter 𝑡 = 0 . 
Step 1:  𝑟𝑖 ← 𝑟𝑖𝑡 . Calculate system reliability using (2) and obtain payoff matrix 𝑦𝑡. Run the LP model (7)-(9) to obtain 𝜓𝑖𝑡. 
Step 2: 𝑡 ൌ 𝑡 + 1 .Pump the budget 𝐵𝑡  until the first element 
reaches to perfect reliability 1.00 using the following equation: 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝜓𝑖𝑡−1𝐵𝑡 𝑐𝑖⁄ + 𝑟𝑖𝑡−1. 
Step 3: calculate the remaining budget by 𝐵𝑅 − ∑𝐵𝑡  If the 
total budget 𝐵𝑅 is not exhausted or the desire system reliability 
is not achieved, go to Step 1, otherwise return the system 
reliability 𝑟𝑖 ← 𝑟𝑖𝑡. 
The modified RTBS system is employed to demonstrate the 
algorithm performance. The target is to have perfect reliability 
1.00 based on (2). Table IV shows one iteration of the proposed 
model. The column 𝑟𝑖0  simply displays the initial elements 
reliability as shown in Fig.1. Column 𝑅𝑖′0 shows the reliability degradation as a result of damaging component 𝑖 , which is 
needed to calculate damage utility function shown in column 
𝑦𝑖0. According to Step 1,  𝜓𝑖0 are the game variables obtained from LP problem (7)-(9). Now we can pump the budget 𝐵1 
based on the equation shown in Step 2. To this end, the budget 
is increased until the first element reaches its desired reliability. 
In this case, by increasing the budget to 𝐵1 = 0.35, the 𝑟𝑔1 is 
the first elements that reaches to the perfect reliability of 1.00, 
meanwhile there are some reliability improvement for 𝑟7  and 
𝑟𝑔2 based on their game variable. At the end of iteration 1, the 
system reliability jumped from 0.917 to 0.952. This procedure 
is repeated six times, consuming total budget 1.00 and the 
system reliability (2) reaches to the perfect value of 1.00. 
Fig. 6 shows the cumulative reliability improvement for the 
six iterations. As an instance, while the second iteration allocates 
the budget equal to 0.205, the associated budget in the figure is 
0.555, which is summation of 0.205 in the second iteration and 
0.35 in the first iteration.  As can be seen, while the budget and 
system reliability target are similar to the case shown in Fig.4, 
the game-theoretic model employed a different strategy rather 
than the traditional model. The improvement results are clearly 
visible in Fig.7, where a comparison between both models is 
provided for each element. 
TABLE IV.  INSTANCE OF ONE ITERATION OF THE PROPOSED METHOD 
Element 𝒓𝒊𝟎 𝑹𝒊′𝟎 𝒚𝒊𝟎 𝝍𝒊𝟎 𝒓𝒊𝟏 
𝒓𝟏 0.897 0.707 0.79 0 0.897 
𝒓𝟐 0.797 0.763 0.846 0 0.797 
𝒓𝟑 0.805 0.784 0.867 0 0.805 
𝒓𝟒 0.909 0.804 0.887 0 0.909 
𝒓𝟓 0.966 0.804 0.887 0 0.966 
𝒓𝟔 0.617 0.86 0.943 0 0.617 
𝒓𝟕 0.9 0.687 0.77 0.002 0.901 
𝒓𝒈𝟏 0.91 0.447 0.53 0.512 1.000 
𝒓𝒈𝟐 0.85 0.47 0.553 0.486 0.935 
 
 
Fig. 6. Inctance of one iteration of the proposed method 
 
Fig. 7. Inctance of one iteration of the proposed method 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Power system reliability improvement is among the most 
sophisticated problems because of its nonlinear nature. This 
nonlinearity makes the problem considerably complicated for 
large-scale power systems. We define the reliability as the 
availability of paths between loads and generators and propose 
an index for overall system’s reliability based on the 
normalized summation of all the routes between demands and 
sources. Then we introduce two budget allocation models for 
power grid reliability improvement, where the first model 
follows traditional approach to reliability improvement and the 
second model is a game-theoretic linear programming model. 
In the first model, the limited budget is allocated to the elements 
to maximize system reliability by nonlinear programming. 
However, this approach is highly non-convex and non-linear 
for large-scale problems, which commonly result in an 
inefficient solution.  
In the second method, we propose a linear two-player zero-
sum mixed-strategy game for the budget allocation problem. 
This game should repeat iteratively using the proposed 
algorithm until the budget is exhausted, or the reliability 
reaches the desired level. The second approach is linear, and 
hence convex, and promotes effective solutions even for the 
large-scale power systems. The case studies run on the modified 
RTBS systems shows the two approaches result in the same 
reliability level for a given budget, albeit with a different 
strategy. For the future work, one may apply the model to a 
large-scale power network as well as further improve the 
algorithm used in the game-theoretic approach. 
Moreover, Mother Nature causes damage to an electric grid 
as a matter of randomness. She is not an adversary and does not 
cause damage deliberately. The zero-sum game used in this 
paper treated her as an adversary, which is a conservative 
consideration. One may address this issue using other than a 
zero-sum game like a non-cooperative game, which will fit 
Mother Nature role more accurately. 
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